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The Impact of the Cost of Capital and of the Decision to Invest or to Divest on 










It is usually difficult to exhibit a statistically significant effect of the cost of 
capital on investment. It is in contradiction with the common practice of the selection of 
investment project relies on expected discounted returns, where the discount factor is the 
tax adjusted weighted average cost of capital (WACC). In this practice, WACC plays a 
role first, as a cut-off value for investment decisions and second, as a cost limiting the 
amount of investment. We first test the idea that WACC matters very much for the 
investment or divestment decisions, which is in line with the common practice. This test 
is made on a panel of very small French Services firms, which includes a large number of 
firms who divest. On this basis, we are then able to deal with endogenous selection 
problems when we then investigate the relationship between the quantity of investment or 
divestment as a function of WACC and other variables. It turns then that the long run user 
cost elasticity of firms who invest is close to one whereas the long run user cost elasticity 
of firms who divest is close to zero. This suggests that the downward bias of the user cost 
elasticity on the full sample is due to an aggregation bias between firms who invest and 
firms who divest. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The effect of the user cost of capital on capital is generally difficult to find. The available evidence 
shows that the cost of capital channel of monetary policy has no effect on corporate investment in 
France at the macroeconomic level. Three French forecasting models developed in the 1990s do not 
include the cost of capital (see Amadeus by INSEE, Mosaïque by OFCE, and the model developed by 
the Banque de France), while INSEE's Metric model adds a relative factor cost whose parameter is 
small (-0.016) and not significant (see Assouline et al. [1998]). Herbet [2001] published a recent 
estimation of macroeconomic investment and recognised its failure to incorporate interest rate or user 
cost effects. 
Five recent studies have focused on the effect of the user cost at the firm level. The 
results vary considerably. Using the BACH European database “aggregated by size and 
sector” based on Banque de France sample data, Beaudu and Heckel [2001] found a zero 
elasticity for the four largest euro area countries including France. Using the INSEE BIC-
BRN database, Duhautois [2001] aggregated data by sector and size from 1985 to 1996. He 
found a real interest rate elasticity of -0.38 for the period 1985-1990 and of -0.27 for the 
period 1991-1996. Using a sample of individual firm accounts (INSEE BIC database), Crépon 
and Gianella [2001] obtained a user cost elasticity of -0.63 for industry and of -0.35 for 
services over the period 1990-1995. Using the BACH database, like Beaudu and Heckel 
[2001], Mojon Smets and Vermeulen [2001] obtained a high elasticity for the user cost for 
France (-0.75). Finally, Chatelain and Tiomo [2002] found a user cost elasticity of –0.26 for 
industrial firms. These relatively small user cost elasticities may stem from heterogeneity of 
firms if there is a threshold on the level of investment necessary to find a effect of the user 
cost on the amount invested. 
The common practice of the selection of investment project relies on expected 
discounted returns, where the discount factor is the tax adjusted weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC). In this practice, WACC plays a role first, as a cut-off value for investment 
decisions and second, as a cost limiting the amount of investment. We first test the idea that 
WACC matters very much for the investment or divestment decisions, which is in line with 
the common practice. This test is made on a panel of very small French Services firms, which 
includes a large number of firms who divest. On this basis, we are then able to deal with 
endogenous selection problems when we then investigate the relationship between the 
quantity of investment or divestment as a function of WACC and other variables. It turns then 
that the long run user cost elasticity of firms who invest is close to one whereas the long run 
user cost elasticity of firms who divest is close to zero. This suggests that the downward bias  
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of the user cost elasticity on the full sample is due to an aggregation bias between firms who 
invest and firms who divest. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the theoretical model and the 
estimation method. Section 2 presents the data and the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2.  THE INTERTEMPORAL BEHAVIOUR OF FIRMS 
 
2.1 Theoretical  Model 
We consider a profit-maximising firm which does not face adjustment costs of investment 
but does face tax deductibility of depreciation and interest charges as well as a marginal cost 
of debt increasing with leverage. A one-period model was developed by Auerbach [1983] and 
Hayashi [2000] presented an intertemporal continuous time version. Our presentation is based 
on discrete time intertemporal optimisation of firms facing uncertainty. With respect to King 
and Fullerton's [1984] approach, we do not take into account the differences in household 
taxation with respect to dividends and retained earnings nor the distinction between different 
capital goods for the computation of the net present value of depreciation allowances. We 
assume one financial constraint: the cost of debt increases with leverage. However, a firm can 
always get round this constraint using negative dividends or new share issues. We do not take 
into account other financial constraints such as positive dividends, a transaction cost for new 
share issues, or a debt ceiling constraint. 
Analysing investment begins with an expression of the value of the firm, which in turn 
stems from the arbitrage condition governing the valuation of shares for risk-neutral investors. 
The return for the risk-neutral owners of firm i at time t reflects capital appreciation and 
current dividends. In equilibrium, if the owners are to be content holding their shares, this 
return must equal  t ρ  the nominal return on other risky financial assets between period t and 
period  1 + t  :
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In what follows, the subscript i always refers to firm i and the subscript t to year t,  t E  is 
the expectation operator conditional on information known at time t,  it d  are dividends,  it V  is 
the firm's nominal market value (it is equal to the number of existing shares times the share 
price 
E
it p ),  it Ψ  is new share issues. Solving this iterative arbitrage condition leads investors 
in firm i to choose the stock of capital and debt by maximizing the present value of dividends 
less new share issues at time t in a infinite horizon:  
 
(2) 
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where the firm's one-period nominal discount factor is     ) 1 /( 1 t t ρ β + = . Investment  it I  is 
defined by the capital stock  it K  accounting identity: 
 
(3)      ()   1 1 , − − − = t i it it K K I δ , 
 
δ  is the constant rate of economic depreciation. The flow of funds equation defines 
corporate dividends. Cash inflows include sales, new share issues, and net borrowing, while 
cash outflows consist of dividends, factor and interest payments, and investment 
expenditures. Labour charges, interest charges and accounting depreciation are tax deductible. 
For simplification, we consider that accounting depreciation does not differ from economic 
depreciation. An investment tax credit rate  it itc  is taken into account: 
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Where  it N  is a vector of variable factors of production,  () it it N K F ,  is the firm's revenue 
function ( 0   , 0 < > KK K F F ),  t w  is a vector of nominal factor prices,  it i  is the nominal interest 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 To be more precise, ρ  is an expected return on a large number of risky financial assets between date t  and 
date  1 + t . Applying the law of large numbers leads this expected return to be considered as realized ex-post 
and therefore known with certainty ex-ante.  
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rate on debt,  it B  is the value of net debt outstanding,  it p  is the price of final goods, 
I
st p  is the 
sectoral price of capital goods; 
S
st p  is the price of new share issues;  t τ  is the corporate income 
tax rate, against which interest payments and depreciation are assumed to be deductible. 
The nominal interest rate on debt at time t depends on an agency premium which 
increases with debt and decreases with capital taken as collateral and therefore valued by the 
current resale price of investment. We assume that the debt interest rate increases with the 
debt/capital ratio:  .   0  with  ,    ) / (
' > it it
I
st it it i K p B i  
 
After substitution of dividends by the flow of funds and of investment using the capital 
stock equation, we provide first order conditions for the maximisation of the firm's value. 
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This condition shows that the optimal debt/capital ratio is independent from the choice of 
capital (the optimal debt/capital ratio is unique if for example  0 2
' ' ' > +i i ). This optimal 
debt/capital ratio results from the trade-off between the tax advantage of debt and the increase 
of the agency costs premium. It is such that the optimal gap between the rate of return on 
equity (i.e. the opportunity cost of equity) and the net-of-tax marginal cost of debt is positive. 
The Euler equation with respect to capital is:  
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Each of these three components depends on tax policy. The term  1 1 c −  leads to the Hall 
and Jorgenson (1967) formula for the cost of capital without tax distortions between means of 
finance and between depreciated assets. Taxation matters via the investment tax credit which 
decreases the price of investment. The term  2 c  is obtained after substitution using the Euler 
condition on debt. It decreases the cost of capital due to the tax deductibility of interest 
charges under the constraint of an increasing cost of debt as leverage increases. In this 
respect, a higher optimal leverage decreases the cost of capital. The term  3 c  decreases the 
cost of capital due to the deductibility of depreciated capital. To take into account the case 
where accounting depreciation differs from constant economic depreciation, one has to cancel 
the third term of the cost of capital  3 c  and substitute the correction of the investment price 
() it itc 1−  everywhere it appears by () it it z − − itc 1 , where  it z  is the net present value of 
depreciation allowances (Hayashi [2000, p.60]). 
Using a first order approximation with respect to the rate of depreciation, to the tax-
corrected inflation rate of the price of investment goods and to the rate of return on equity, 
one finds a weighted average cost of capital used by applied researchers (the cost of equity 
and the after-tax cost of debt are weighted by their relative share with respect to capital): 
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The Hayashi [2000, p.80] formula can be obtained by setting the investment tax credit  it itc  
to zero and by assuming a constant corporate income tax rate ( 1 , + = t i t it Eτ τ ). In our applied 
work, we use : 


























































We set the investment tax credit rate to zero. The investment tax credit rate is 0% for more 
than 80% of companies and over 95% for 5% of companies (hence creating many outliers 
with near zero user cost), we finally did not take it into account. We used an accounting 
measure of capital in leverage instead of an economic one: the denominator of leverage is the 
accounting sum of debt B and of equity E instead of the stock of capital computed by the 
perpetual inventory method. This is empirically justified on the grounds that it is the 
accounting proportions of debt or of equity which matter for tax deductibility. Using the stock 
of capital computed by the perpetual inventory method does not guarantee that the share of 
debt in capital and the share of equity in capital sum to one. We use a proxy for the marginal 
cost of debt which has the drawback of being an average rate  it AI  (the ratio of interest and 
similar charges to gross debt) but which as the advantage of providing information at the firm 
level and of increasing the variance of the user cost (61237 observations) with respect to a 
national annual rate that we use for the opportunity cost of equity (10 observations, as the 
estimation period lasts 10 years). 
 
2.2  Parameterization and Econometric Model 
We parameterize the production function as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
production function ( it Q  is sales): 

















 + = =
1 1 1
, it it it it it it bL aK A N K F Q      
A, a, and b are productivity parameters, υ  represents returns to scale and σ  is the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labour. Computing the marginal productivity of capital 
and taking logs (small letters represent logs of capital letters), we obtain this long-run demand 
for capital: 


















+ =  
For simplification, productivity is assumed to be of the form 
2 1 η η
t i it A A A = , so that the 
constant and the productivity term  () () a Ait . ln ln ] / ) 1 [( υ σ υ σ + − −  are taken into account by 
the constant related to individual firms (fixed effect)  i α  and the time dummies  t α . 
We assume an econometric adjustment process in the form of an auto-regressive distributed 
lag model with two lags with respect to the auto-regressive term and one or two lags with 
respect to explanatory variables, as in Hall, Mairesse, Mulkay [2000].  
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where  it ε  is an error term normally distributed. We add cash-flow (otherwise a potentially 
omitted variable, among other variables) on the grounds that our model does not take fully 
into account financial constraints. The long-run elasticity of sales is given by 
) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 1 0 LT γ γ β β β − − + = , the long-run elasticity of the cost of capital is given by 
) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 1 0 LT γ γ σ σ σ − − + − = − , the long run capital cash flow sensitivity is given by 
) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 1 0 LT γ γ θ θ β − − + =  Returns to scale are given by  ) /( ) 1 ( LT LT LT σ β σ ν − − = . 
3. ESTIMATION METHOD 
The estimation of this econometric model presents three potential groups of problems. 
First, there may be a correlation between explanatory variables and the fixed effect on 
productivity level  i α . This feature is corrected by taking first differences in the ADL/ECM 
model or by taking second differences in the difference ADL model. Second, explanatory 
variables can be endogenous, so that an instrumental variables method is recommended. 
Third, there is heteroscedasticity of disturbances. A method which takes into account these 
problems is the generalised method of moments on first differences (GMM) (Arellano and 
Bond [1991]). The GMM estimation proceeds in two steps. A first step is an instrumental 
variable estimation which provides estimated residuals. The second step takes into account 
heteroscedasticity. Both first and second step estimates are consistent. The second step 
estimates are efficient while the first ones are not (see Matyas [1999] for a detailed 
presentation of GMM estimations). We estimate all models with first differences GMM and 
instruments in levels with the Arellano and Bond [1991] method, using the DPD98 programs 
on Gauss. 
  We also estimate the effect of the user cost of capital and the effect of cash flow on 
capital demand according to investment or divestment decisions:  
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where  it z  is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm i has strictly positive net investment on 
date t else equal to zero. More generally, the regression models are: 
(13)                  , 1   if                      
' = + + = it it i it it z x k ν µ β  
(14)           . 0   if                     
' = + + = it it i it it z s k ψ α δ  
where 
'
it x  and 
'
it s  are vectors of explanatory variables included in the vector of explanatory 
variables of equation (12),  i µ  are firm fixed effect when it has strictly positive net 
investment,  it ν  and  it ψ   are random terms for each regime. To take into account the 
endogenous selection problem, we use a Tobit model. The selection process related to the net 
investment/net divestment decision is described as follows: 
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it z  a latent variable and 
'
it w  the vector of explanatory variables of the decision to invest or to 
divest 
*
it z  detailed later on. The Tobit model includes three individual effects  i ζ , i µ  et  i α  
taking into account the observed heterogeneity of individuals. 
The problem when estimating equations (13) or (14) is that random disturbances of these 
models may not be independent from the selection rule (i.e.  () 0 , cov ≠ ζ µ  and/or 
() 0 , cov ≠ η ν ). In this case, estimators may be biased. Nijman and Verbeek [1992, 1996] 
proposed to adapt Heckman’s [1981] two steps procedure on cross sections to panel data.  
For the first step, one estimates parameters γ  of the Probit model (with maximum likelihood). 
The second step consists to add an additional regressor (Mills’ ratio) in the regression model 
which corrects from endogenous selection computed with the help of estimates γ  obtained at 
the first step. With panel data, Nijman and Verbeek [1992, 1996] demonstrated that individual  
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fixed effects lead to add in the regression in the second step model two regressors, denoted 
it 2 i 1 A et    A , which corresponds to covariances between fixed effects  i µ  et  i ξ  for the first one, 
and between random terms  it η  et  it ν  for the second one. More precisely : 
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We use Moreau [2000] SAS IML program to estimate our Probit model with random effects 
on unbalanced panel data. This program provides variables  it 2 i 1 A et    A , (inverses of Mills 
ratios) (see Moreau [2000] and Blanchard [2001]). We then added these additional variables 
in the capital demand equation with dummy variables related to investment or divestment 
decision, which we estimated with the Generalized Method of Moments. 
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3.  DATA AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
3.1  Data 
Data are annual balance sheets of French services firms (except holdings) collected in the 
Diane database from 1996 to 2000. NAF Sectors are hotels and restaurants (HH), transports 
and telecommunications (II), financial services (JJ) housing, renting services (KK), education 
(MM), health and social services (NN), collective social and personal services (OO), 
domestic services (PP). We cleaned the data set from outliers (see appendix) and reach a final 
number of firms which amount to 6143 firms (see appendix A1 and A2 for further details). 
Table 1 provides the average value of variables used in the computation of the user cost of 
capital. 
Table 1 : Average value of  the cost of debt and of the user cost of capital 






user cost of 
capital 
1996 0,981 0,784 0,116  0,015  0,08  0,146 
1997 0,989 0,722 0,127  0,013  0,08  0,156 
1998 0,991 0,704 0,124  0,010  0,08  0,151 
1999 0,997 0,690 0,112  0,014  0,08  0,140 
2000 1,017 0,672 0,123  0,014  0,08  0,146 
Average  0,995 0,714 0,120  0,013  0,08  0,148 
 
 
The average user cost of capital for these services firms is lower than the one of industrial 
firms during the same period (14,8% over the period 1996-2000 versus 17%, over the same 
period on the industrial firms sample used by Chatelain and Tiomo [2001]). 
Descriptive statistics shows that more than half of these services firms has a negative growth 
rate of capital of –3,6% : their level of investment was lower than the economic depreciation 
rate (table 2). 
  
Page 12 
Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics over the period 1996-2000 for services firms  




minimum  25% median 75%  Maximum 
I/K-1  0,128 0,412 -0,785 -0,001 0,045 0,166 6,220 
log(K)  5,341 1,400 -0,174 4,400 5,300 6,230 12,05 
log(Q)  8,270 0,859 5,179 7,706 8,148 8,740 14,07 
log(UC)  -1,973 0,339 -3,336 -2,165 -1,999 -1,823 -1,000 
CF/K-1  4,590 15,35 -333,2 0,667 1,693 4,263 635,8 
∆ log(K)  -0,005 0,316 -1,998 -0,085 -0,036 0,083  1,965 
∆ log(Q)  0,064 0,198 -0,996 -0,031 0,047 0,150 0,997 
∆ log(UC)  -0,023 0,249 -0,998 -0,132 -0,011 0,097  0,998 
 
By contrast, half of those firms faced a sales growth rate higher than 4.6% over the period 
1996-2000, and for a quarter of them, a sales growth rate higher than 15%. More than half of 
those firms faced a decrease of their user cost of capital. 
We check for potential sectoral discrepancies (table 3a and 3b). We found relatively little 
sectoral discrepancies with respect to growth rates of capital, of sales and of the user cost. 
Cash flow is particularly high for the financial sector. The average size of firms is higher for 
the health and social action sector.  
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   (NT = 4173)  (NT = 5288)  (NT = 425)  (NT = 10959)  (NT = 285)  (NT = 2090)  (NT = 1520) 
   mean std mean  std mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std 
Employees 12,3 20,1 21,6  70,3 10,7 20,4 17,0 67,3 11,9 15,4 34,9 49,4 18,0 61,8 
CF/K-1  1,4  3,6  1,9  5,9 12,0  29,5 7,5 20,9 3,4 13,1 2,5  6,9  2,8  6,3 
Dlog(K)  0,0 0,2 0,0  0,3 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,4 0,1 0,4 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,3 
Dlog(Q)  0,1 0,2 0,1  0,2 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 
Dlog(UC)  0,0 0,2 0,0  0,3 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,2 
 




















   (NT = 4173)  (NT = 5288)  (NT = 425)  (NT = 10959) (NT = 285)  (NT = 2090)  (NT = 1520) 
0-9  Employees  2464 2675  309 6831 178  623 934,0 
10-19  employees  1018 1216  68 2118 54  474  273,0 
20-49  employees  598 1028  36 1427 49  544  241,0 
50-99  employees  73 193  4 365 4 257  52,0 
<100  employees  20 176  8 218 0 192  20,0 
 
The size distribution shows that our sample consists mostly of small and medium size firms 
(less than 50 employees). 
 
3.2. The impact of the user cost of capital on investment, without taking into account the 
investment/divestment decision  
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Table 4 below shows estimates of the ADL model using Within transformation, GMM first 
differences with instrumental variables in level (Arrelano and Bond [1991]) and GMM 
simultaneous system estimates of the model in first differences with instruments in levels and 
of the model in levels with instruments in first differences (Arrelano and Bover [1995]). 
Instrumental variables are listed below the table. The choice of instruments have been made 
according an upward testing procedure described by Andrews [1999] and Chatelain [2001]. 
Within estimates are all significantly different from zero, but their estimates are small and 
with little economic sense. As predicted by econometric theory, the auto-regressive parameter 
is downward biased (0,009): within estimates are not able to provide unbiased estimates of 
this endogenous regressor. 
Columns labeled GMM deals with Arrelano and Bond [1991] method. The auto-regressive 
parameter is then much higher (0,48). Sargan exogeneity test is successful but the lack of 
second order autocorrelation test (Arrelano and Bond’s m2) is rejected. 
Columns labeled SYSMMG presents Arrelano and Bover’s [1995] estimates. Sargan 
exogeneity test and the lack of autocorrelation of order two (m2 test) are respectively 
accepted at the 28% threshold and the 5% threshold. The autoregressive estimate (0,54) is 
close to the difference GMM (0,48). By contrast, short run sales and user cost elasticities are 
far smaller in absolute value. The discrepancies between GMM and SYS-GMM estimates 
suggest a potential specification problem.  
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Table 4 : Estimates of the ADL model (Within, (DIF-)GMM, SYS-GMM) 
   WITHIN DIF-GMM SYS-GMM WITHIN DIF-GMM  SYS-GMM 
   coef. T stats  coef. T stats coef.  T stats coef. T stats  coef.  T stats coef.  T stats 
logKt-1 0,063  5,0  0,478 4,0  0,447 2,8  0,061 4,8  0,498 4,5  0,421  1,8 
logKt-2 0,028  2,3  0,003 0,1  0,089 0,8  0,026 2,1  0,001 0,0  0,142  0,9 
logQt 0,210  11,6  1,284 1,9  0,428 1,9  0,212 11,5  1,179 2,0  0,828  2,8 
logQt-1 0,118  6,5  -0,546 -1,6  -0,213 -1,0  0,120 6,5  -0,478 -1,5  -0,630  -2,2 
logCUt -0,197  -12,7 -0,763 -1,8  -0,371 -3,3  -0,197 -12,7  -0,742 -1,9  -0,336  -2,3 
logCUt-1 -0,040  -2,7  0,151 1,6  0,053 1,3  -0,040 -2,7  0,146 1,7  0,065  1,5 
CFt/Kt-1                 0,000 -0,6  0,001 0,3  -0,001  -0,1 
CFt-1/Kt-2                    0,000 -0,8  0,000 -0,2  0,011  1,7 
Sum of auto-regressive coefficients 0,091    0,481    0,536   0,088    0,499   0,563  
Long term sales elasticities  0,361    1,422    0,924   0,364    1,398   0,453  
Long term user cost elasticities  -0,260    -1,180   -0,801  -0,260   -1,190  -0,623   
Long term cash flow sensitivities                    n.s     n.s     0,023   
                                
AR2       -2,44 P=0,015 -1,95 P=0,050       -2,487P=0,013 -1,19 p=0,230
Sargan        5,03 P=0,540 13,16 P=0,280       7,303 P=0,504  9,35 p=0,580
Note : Lags 2 and 3 of explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first differences GMM estimations. 
For system GMM estimations, we use logKt-3 , logQt-2 , logQt-3 , logUCt-2 , logUCt-3 (logCFt-3 for the model with 
cash flow) for instruments of the first difference equation, and first differences of logKt-3 , logQt-2 , logQt-3 , 
logUCt-2 , logUCt-3 as instruments for the level equation. 
 
In order to test for misspecification, we added cash flow as a potentially omitted variable in 
the former regressions (among others). These results are reported on right hand side of table 4 
(columns 7 to 12). The parameter of lag 2 of cash flow is significantly different from zero 
only in the System GMM estimates, with a rather small short run estimate (0,01) and long run 
estimate (0,023). In the system GMM, due to collinearity between cash flow and sales, the 
sales coefficient are modified, whereas auto-regressive parameters and user cost change 
slightly. We then investigate another potential misspecification problem. Descriptive statistics 
show that more than 25% of firms in the sample divested (net fixed assets (purchase less  
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sales) is zero or less than zero) Those firms are likely to be less sensitive to the user cost, as 
they are able to finance their purchases of fixed assets (if they do invest) by their sales of 
fixed assets.
4 Next section tests the impact of the net investment decision on the determinant 
of the amount of investment. 
3.2  The Elasticity of Capital with respect to its User Cost depends on the 
Investment/Divestment Decision. 
3.2.1  Explaining the Investment/Divestment Decision 
We first analyse desciptive statistics for each group of firms  : those who exhibit strictly 
positive net investment and the others (table 5). Indeed, capital growth rate is much higher for 
the first group (an average of 10,8%, a median capital growth rate of 2,3%) with respect to the 
other group (-26% average, -14,7% median). The growth rate of the user cost of capital is 
much lower for the first group (-3,5% average, -1,9% median) than for the other group (0,4% 
average and 0,6% median). The growth rate of sales is higher for the first group (8% average 
and 5,9% median) with respect to the second group (2,8% average and 2,4% median). 
                                                      
4 Available statistics in the database provided only net fixed assets (purchases less sales) and did not allow us to 
distinguish between purchases and sales.  
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Table 5 : Descriptive statistics according to net investment sign 
 
Net Investment >0 
(NT = 17185; 69% observations) 
Net Investment<=0 
 (NT=7554; 31% observations) 
   Average Median Average Median 
I/K-1  0,237 0,103 -0,121  -0,057 
log(K)  0,108 0,023 -0,261  -0,147 
log(Q)  8,323 8,185 8,155 8,064 
log(UC)  -1,992 -2,013 -1,929 -1,964 
CF/K-1  4,651 1,827 4,457 1,401 
iB/B  0,114 0,069 0,138 0,079 
∆ log(K)  0,108 0,023 -0,26 -0,147 
∆ log(Q)  0,08  0,059 0,028 0,024 
∆ log(UC)  -0,035 -0,019 0,0047 0,0064 
 
 
Descriptive statistics allows to check discrepancies between the two groups variable by 
variable (univariate analysis). We use Probit estimation with random effects for multivariate 
analysis (tables 6a and 6b). Table 6a provides estimated parameters and Student’s statistics. 
Table 6b provides marginal effects for each of the variables. RHO correlation coefficient 
(table 6a) measures the share of the variance of the individual random effects in the total 
variance of the error term (cf. Moreau [2000] for details). This share is around 14% and 
significantly different from zero, which justifies ex post the use of the random effect model 
(results of the Probit model without random effect are given in appendix A3). 
The probability of a strictly positive net investment decision increases with the growth rate of 
sales and decreases with the growth rate of the user cost. The effect of these two variables of 
the neo-classical investment model is rather large (-0,585 for the user cost at the average point 
of the sample). The probability of net investment increases with the size of the firm. In large 
firms includes, several production units have different investment needs, so that net net 
aggregated investment inside the firm is more likely to be positive. The probability of net 
investment is higher for hotel and restaurants (HH), education (MM), health and social action 
(NN) and social and personal services (OO) than for transportation and telecommunications  
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(II), financial services (JJ), housing and leasing services (KK). Financial variables such as 
cash flow and leverage (measured by the debt/capital ratio) exhibit parameters significantly 
different from zero, but with marginal effects at the average point of the sample close to zero 
(table 6b). 
Table 6a : Random Effect Probit estimation of the probability of strictly positive net investment 
   coefficient T  stats 
    
Constant 0,686  23,5 
Size of Firms       
0-9 employees  ref  - 
10-19 employees  0,058  2,2 
20-49 employees  0,140  4,8 
50-99 employees  0,220  4,2 
<100 employees  0,267  4,1 
Firms Sectors       
Hotels and Restaurants (HH)  0,279  9,3 
Transports and communications (II)  -0,053  -2,0 
Financial Services (JJ)  0,051  0,7 
Housing and Renting Services to Firms (KK)  ref  - 
Education (MM)  0,242  2,5 
Health and Social Action (NN)  0,309  7,2 
Collective, Social and Personal Services (OO)  0,266  6,0 
Real and Financial Variables       
Sales Growth Rate: ∆  logQt  0,866 18,9 
Cash-flows : CFt/Kt-1 -0,004  -6,6 
Leverage: Bt/PiKt -0,001  -10,5 
User Cost of Capital : Cut -1,818  -12,4 
RHO 0,141  13,9 




Table 6b : Estimation of marginal effects at the average point of the sample 
   Effect  Standard Error T stats  Mean 
      
Constant  0,221  0,009 24,7 1,000 
Size of Firms             
0-9 employees  ref  - - - 
10-19  employees  0,019  0,009 2,2 0,211 
20-49  employees  0,045  0,009 4,8 0,159 
50-99  employees  0,071  0,017 4,2 0,038 
<100  employees  0,086  0,021 4,1 0,026 
Firms Sectors             
Hotels and Restaurants (HH)  0,090  0,010  9,3  0,169 
Transports and communications (II)  -0,017  0,009  -2,0  0,214 
Financial Services (JJ)  0,016  0,025  0,7  0,017 
Housing and Renting Services to Firms (KK)  ref  - - - 
Education  (MM)  0,078  0,032 2,5 0,012 
Health and Social Action (NN)  0,099  0,014  7,2  0,084 
Collective, Social and Personal Services (OO)  0,086  0,014  6,0  0,061 
Real and Financial Variables             
Sales Growth Rate: ∆  logQt  0,279  0,015 18,9 0,064 
Cash-flows : CFt/Kt-1  -0,001  0,000 -6,6 4,485 
Leverage: Bt/PiKt 0,000  0,000  -10,6  12,849 
User Cost of Capital : Cut  -0,585  0,047 -12,4 0,148 
 
3.2.2  Endogenous Selection and Investment Behaviour 
In this last step of our analysis, we check whether firms who exhibit strictly positive net 
investment are more sensitive to the user cost of capital than the other group of firms. Table 7 
presents estimations of the auto-regressive distributed lag model described by equation (12). 
The dummy variable related to strictly positive net investment multiplies the log of the cost of 
capital and of cash flow and their first lag. Multiplying sales by this dummy variable did not 
lead to goods results in terms of statistical tests (Sargan test and m2 test). As this dummy 
variable leads to endogenous selection (as shown in the preceding section), we added 
corrective terms  it i A A 2 1   and    according to Nijman and Verbeek’s [1992, 1996] procedure. We  
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instrumented those additional variables by some of their lags (the list of instruments is given 
below table 7). 
Four results are striking in these estimations. First, the short run user cost elasticity for firms 
who exhibit a strictly positive net investment (Id(I>0)*Log(CU(t) variable) is equal to –0,3. 
This estimate does not change according to the estimation method («  First differences 
GMM » and « System GMM ») neither according to the instrument set
5. By contrast, the short 
run user cost (and its lag) elasticities for firms with net divestment are not significantly 
different from zero for all the regressions we run with various instruments set (and not only 
the four which are reported here).  
 
                                                      
5 In regressions which do not take into account the investment/divestment decision, the user cost elasticity was –
0,76 with first differences GMM estimations whereas it was –0.37 with system GMM estimations..  
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Table 7 : Effects of the net investment decision on investment determinants 
   DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
   coefficien T stats coefficien T stats coefficien T stats coefficien T stats 
logKt-1  1,120 2,9 1,100 2,8 0,676 2,2  0,603  2,5 
logKt-2  -0,327 -1,1 -0,350 -1,1 0,151  0,6  0,136  0,7 
logQt  0,667 1,6 0,838 1,8 0,289 1,3  0,314  1,5 
logQt-1  -0,235 -0,9 -0,225 -0,9 -0,208 -1,0  -0,188  -1,0 
logCUt  -0,252 -0,5 -0,372 -0,7 0,066  0,6  0,018  0,2 
logCUt-1  0,062 0,7 0,128 1,0 0,078 1,1  0,068  1,2 
CFt/Kt-1  0,002 0,5 0,002 0,5 -0,004  -1,0  -0,002  -0,7 
CFt-1/Kt-2  0,002 0,6 0,002 0,7 -0,002  -1,1  0,001  0,8 
Differential Coefficients for Firms with  It>0                         
Id(I>0).logCUt  -0,303 -2,6 -0,300 -2,5 -0,284 -4,2  -0,305  -6,5 
Id(I>0)logCUt-1  0,149 1,1 0,109 0,7 -0,039  -0,3  -0,029  -0,3 
Id(I>0)CFt/Kt-1  -0,004 -1,1 -0,005 -1,2 0,003  0,6  0,000  -0,1 
Id(I>0)CFt-1/Kt-2  -0,003 -0,7 -0,004 -0,8 0,013  1,9  0,001  0,3 
Probit Model Variables Correcting for 
Ed i
                       
A1                 -0,009  -2,8 
A2t        0,002  0,6      -0,009  -2,7 
Long Term Coefficients                         
Sum of Auto-regressive Parameters  0,792     0,749     0,827     0,739   
Long Term Sales Elasticities  3,207     3,341     n.s    1,201   
For Firms with It<=0                         
Long Term User Cost Elasticities  n.s     n.s     n.s     n.s    
Long Term Cash Flow Sensitivities  n.s    n.s    n.s  n.s  
For Firms with  It>0                         
Long Term User Cost Elasticities  -1,457     -1,196     -1,640     -1,165   
Long Term Cash Flow Sensitivities  n.s    n.s     0,077     n.s  
AR2  -1,96 p=0,05 -2,012  P=0,04 -1,940  P=0,05 -1,800  p=0,07
Sargan  2,16 P=0,99 1,57 P=0,99 8,00 P=0,89 13,60  P=0,94
Instruments used for first difference GMM : logkt-3 , logQt-2 , logQt-3 , logUCt-2 , logUCt-3 , logCFt-2 , logCFt-3 , 
id(I>0).logUCt-3 , id(I>0).logCFt-3 , A1 and A2t-3 
Instruments used for system GMM (a) equation in first differences : logkt-3 , logQt-2 , logQt-3 , logUCt-2 , 
logUCt-3 , logCFt-3 , id(I>0).logUCt-3 and id(I>0).logCFt-3 
We added logCFt-2 , id(I>0).A1 and id(I>0).A2t-4 when the estimated model includes Nijman and Verbeek’s (1992, 
1996) corrective terms.  
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Instruments used for system GMM (b) equation in levels: first differences of the following variables : logKt-3 , 
logQt-3 , logQt-2 , logUCt-3 , logUCt-2 , id(I>0).logUCt-3 , id(I>0).logUCt-2. We added A2t-3 , A2t-2 ID(i>0).A2t-3 a and 
ID(i>0).A2t-2 when the estimated model includes Nijman and Verbeek’s (1992, 1996) corrective terms. 
 
The sum of the auto-regressive component is not significantly different from 0.7 in all 
regressions. Hence, the long run user cost elasticity for firms who exhibit net investment is 
close to -1 (-0,3/(1-07)), which corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas production function with an 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour equal to unity (this elasticity is the 
opposite of the elasticity of capital with respect to its user cost. 
By contrast, the short run and long run user cost elasticity is not significantly different from 
zero for firms with non positive net investment. The amount of the decrease of their net 
capital stock is not driven by the user cost, whereas the decision of a net negative investment 
(Probit model) depends a lot on the user cost. This striking discrepancy with respect to user 
cost elasticity suggests that the user cost elasticity lack precisions when the net investment/net 
divestment is not taken into account in the determinants of the net amount of funds invested 
or divested.  
The second results deals with the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to sales. Estimates 
vary a lot according to regressions and are significantly different from zero at most at the 8% 
threshold. This result is a recurrent weakness of estimations of the neo-classical capital 
demand equations on panel data. In particular, it leads frequently to estimates of returns to 
scale which are obviously too high or too low (Hall, Mairesse, Mulkay [1999]), The 
discrepancy of estimated sales elasticities when using « first differences GMM » and « system 
GMM » has also been found  in Hall, Mairesse, Mulkay [1999].  
The third result concerns investment cash flow sensitivities which are not significantly 
different from zero. Little effect of cash flow was also found in the net investment/divestment 
decision. This suggests that the neo-classical model written with sales and user cost fit the 
data (although alternative models may also fit the data), so that a cash flow add-on (related to 
discounted cash flow measures (Tobin’s Q) or a proxy for financial constraint) is not 
necessary in these regressions.  
The fourth result concerns the variables  it 2 i 1 A et    A , which corrects endogenous selection 
related to the endogeneity of the dummy variable signalling the net investment/divestment 
decision. These two variables exhibit parameters significantly different from zero (column 7 
and 8) although their estimates are small. They lead to rather small corrections of the  
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estimated parameters of other variables of the regression, but on the other hand, they increase 
the acceptation threshold for AR2 test and Sargan’s exogeneity of over-identifying 
restrictions test.  
Finally, the most sensible results are rather given by the system GMM estimation than by the 
first differences estimation, which fits with Arellano and Bover suggestion of better estimates 





We reached three major conclusions about the effect of the user cost on capital demand. First, 
the user cost of capital has a large impact on the investment/divestment decision. As a 
consequence, it is useful to take into account the endogeneity of the investment decision in an 
investment equation on panel data. 
Second, taking into account the endogeneity of the investment/divestment decision, if the firm 
invest, we found a long run user cost elasticity not significantly different from unity (a feature 
which corresponds to a high substitutability of capital and labor in the neo-classical model). 
Third and by contrast, when the firm does not invest or when it divest, the user cost elasticity 
is not significantly different from zero. Once a company had decided to divest (and her 
decision depends very much on the user cost level), then the user cost has no effect on the 
amount of divestment. This result suggest that the second hand value of capital depends much 
more on other factors than the cost of capital. 
These asymmetries between user cost elasticities according to the investment/divestment 
decision suggests that omitting the investment/divestment decision may lead to a downward 
aggregation bias of the elasticities of capital with respect to the user cost. Hence, we showed 
that taking into account the investment/divestment decision and its endogeneity may improve 
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A1. Sample Selection 
The sample consists of balance sheets of French services firms included in the database Diane 
from 1994 to 2000. These firms corresponds, in NAF classification to hotel and restaurants 
(HH), transports and telecommunications (II), financial services (JJ) housing and renting 
services (KK), education (MM), health and social action (NN), collective, social and personal 
services (OO), and finally to domestic services (PP). 
To select the sample, we excluded balance sheets with negative sales, value added, debt or 
assets. We eliminated firms for which the value of one of the variables of interest are over 
five times the inter-quartile interval below the first quartile or over the third quartile, each 
year for the investment ratio ( ) 1 t , i it K I − , the profit rate ( ) 1 t , i it K EBE − , cash-flows/capital 
( ) 1 t , i it K CF − , leverage () it it K B , the user cost of capital () it C , the “apparent” interest rate 
() it it B iB , the sales growth rate () it Q ln ∆  the capital growth rate () it K ln ∆ , and the user cost 
growth rate () it C ln ∆ . We ended with 103 264 observations over the period 1996-2000.  
A2. Construction of the variables 
•   The Individual Variables 
The first source is the compulsory accounting forms required under the French General 
Tax Code. These forms are completed by the firms and numbered by the tax administration 
(D.G.I.) from 2050 to 2058. We provide the code of each form omitting the  first two numbers 
For example, we denote item FN of tax form 2050 as “[50].FN”.  
- Value added at market price () it Q  are total net sales [52].FL, plus the change in 
inventories of own production of goods and services [52].FM, plus own production of goods 
and services capitalised [52].FN less intermediate consumption 
([52].FS+FU+FT+FV+FW+FX).  
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- Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation allowances () it EBE  corresponds to the sum 
of value added and of working subsidies (FO), less taxes (FX), wages (FY), and social 
security payments (FZ).  
- Cash-flows  () it CF  corresponds to EBE plus other exploitation charges (GE), common 
operations (GH+GI), financial income (GJ+GK+GL+GM+GN+GO+GP), exceptional income 
(HA-HE), less financial transfers (GM), financial payments (GQ+GR+GS+GT), workers 
participation (HJ) and corporate income tax (HK). 
- Interest charges  () iit  are given by item GR. 
- Financial Debt () Bit  includes banking debt (DU) and other debt (DV). 
- Equity () it E  is given by item LP. 





























































where  it sub  are investment subsidies (ligne DJ),  it AI  the apparent interest rate (computed 
by :  it it B i ), and  t LD  the 10 years French government bonds rate. 
The capital stock is the value in replacement terms of the capital stock book value of 
property, plant and equipment. To convert the book value of the gross capital stock into its 
replacement value, we used the following iterative perpetual inventory formula: 
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where the investment goods deflator is denoted 
I
st p  and the depreciation rate is taken to be 
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The book value of the gross capital stock of property, plant and equipment 
BV
it K 0  on the 
first available year for each firm is obtained by the sum of land [50].AN, buildings [50].AP, 
industrial and technical plant [50].AR, other plant and equipment [50].AT, plant, property and 
equipment under construction [50].AV and payments in advance/on account for plant, 
property and equipment [50].AX. It is deflated by assuming that the sectoral price of capital is 
equal to the sectoral price of investment  mean T  years before the date when the first book value 
was available, where  mean T  represents the corrected average age of capital (this method of 
evaluation of capital is sometimes called the “stock method”). The average age of capital 
mean T  is computed by using the sectoral useful life of capital goods  max T  and the share of 
goods which has been already depreciated in the first available year in the firm's accounts 




it K p  (
BV
it0 DEPR is the total book value of depreciation allowances in year  0 t  
















































































The book value of depreciation allowances 
BV
it0 DEPR  is obtained by the sum of 
depreciation, amortisation and provisions on land [50].AO, on buildings [50].AQ, on 
industrial and technical plant [50].AS, on other plant and equipment [50].AU, on plant, 
property and equipment under construction [50].AW and on payment in advance/on account 
for plant, property and equipment [50].AY. The sectoral useful life of capital goods is 
15 max = T  years. 
- Investment () Iit  is the difference of the book value of the gross capital stock between this 
year t and the previous year  t-1. 
•   Sectoral variables : Sectoral Price for investment (denoted pst
I ) and value added price 
(denoted  st P ) are found in national accounts (base year 1995). 
•   Aggregate variable : The depreciation rate is 8%. 